We propose an information theoretic framework for the secure two-party function computation (SFC) problem and introduce the notion of SFC capacity. We study and extend string oblivious transfer (OT) to sample-wise OT. We propose an efficient, perfectly private OT protocol utilizing the binary erasure channel or source. We also propose the bootstrap string OT protocol which provides disjoint (weakened) privacy while achieving a multiplicative increase in rate, thus trading off security for rate. Finally, leveraging our OT protocol, we construct a protocol for SFC and establish a general lower bound on SFC capacity of the binary erasure channel and source.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivated by applications ranging from confidential database access to oblivious contract negotiation [1], we study the problem of secure two-party function computation (SFC). In this problem, Alice and Bob each have private data, and they wish to compute functions of both of their data. The objective is to design a protocol that ensures correctness of the computed functions while maintaining individual privacy, in the sense that neither party gains any information about the other's data other than what can be inferred from the result of their function computation. An important special case of this problem is string oblivious transfer (O'T) from [2] , wherein Alice has two strings A o and Al and Bob has a single bit B. An OT protocol should reveal A B to Bob, while Alice remains ignorant of B and Bob of A (I-B) .
We propose an information theoretic framework for SFC and introduce the notion of SFC rates and capacity, in terms of the ratio of samples of computation to samples of correlated randomness needed. Correlated randomness is a noisy resource in the form of a noisy communication channel or distributed random source available between the parties. We cast the string O'I' problem as a special case within our framework and also introduce the sample-wise O'I' problem. We address the string and sample-wise O'I' problems with an efficient perfectly private protocol utilizing the binary erasure channel or source. For the string O'I' problem, we also propose the bootstrap protocol which provides disjoint (weakened) privacy while achieving a multiplicative increase in rate, thus trading off security for rate. Finally, leveraging our O'I' protocol, we IThis material is based upon work supported by the US National Science Foundation (NSF) under award (CAREER) CCF-0546598. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NSF. construct a protocol for SFC and establish a general lower bound on the SFC capacity of the binary erasure channel and source. Due to space limitations, detailed proofs are omitted, but will appear in an extended version of this work.
Our objective is information theoretic (unconditional) security, where even computationally unbounded adversaries must not be able to break the privacy. We work with the assumption of semi-honest (or passive) parties, where the parties honestly follow the protocol. It is well-known that in this setting both O'I' and SFC cannot be realized "from scratch" [3] , [4] , that is with protocols using only noise-free communication channels and local randomness. It has been observed that O'T becomes possible given correlated randomness [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , and that SFC also becomes possible based on O'T [3] . Thus, correlated randomness is a valuable resource as an enabling factor for O'T and SFC. Recently the concept of OT capacity of a channel or source, measuring the fundamental limit of how efficiently the resource can be used toward O'I, has been introduced in [8] , [10] and further characterized by [9] , [11].
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first formulate the SFC problem within a novel information theoretic framework. This framework utilizes conditional mutual information based privacy measures, and defines achievable function computation rate and capacity. We then discuss OT which is encompassed by this SFC framework as a special case. In the last subsection we present the problem of string O'T with the notion of disjoint privacy. For a given function ! : A x B~R f ' Alice wishes to compute samples of a function of the sources pk{ !(AI,BI), ... ,!(Ak,Bk)}. Similarly, Bob wishes to compute C k~{ g(AI,BI), ... ,g(Ak,B k)} where g: A x BR g • Alice and Bob cooperatively compute these functions via an interactive protocol that may exchange messages over an error-free discussion channel and also utilize n samples of correlated randomness. The correlated randomness is a precious resource which comes in two possible forms:
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C. String Oblivious Transfer with Disjoint Privacy
The l-out-of-m string O'I' problem is a special case of the l-out-of-m sample-wise O'T problem, wherein the source distribution is specified as the k x m binary matrix formed by vertically stacking Alice's m-bit samples AI, ... , A k as the rows. Bob wishes to receive the k bits GI, ... ,Gk' where G, == Ai,B i • Alice's privacy condition (1) means that Bob obtains no information about the other k(m -1) bits of A that he did not select. Bob's privacy condition (2) means that Alice obtains no information about Bob's selection B", When dealing with the above scenario, Alice's privacy condition (1) reduces to I({Ai}~I,i#B;ZB,yn,MTIB,AB) < E, which implies that Bob is unable to reconstruct any string that he did not select or any non-trivial joint function of the strings that he did not select without non-negligible probability of error. The interesting alternative notion of disjoint privacy replaces Alice's privacy condition (1) with for i E {I, ... , m}, I(A i; ZB, Y", MTIB, A B) < E, (3) which implies that Bob is unable to reconstruct any non-trivial function of any individual string (including the string itself) that he did not select without non-negligible probability of error. A protocol that satisfies (1) will also satisfy this disjoint privacy condition (3), however the converse is not true. For example, a protocol that reveals to Bob A B and also the binary exclusive-or (XaR) all of the strings A I E9 ... E9 Am will satisfy the disjoint privacy constraint, but will not satisfy (1). A protocol obtains perfect disjoint privacy if the privacy constraints of (3) are exactly zero.
The notion of disjoint privacy is motivated by applications, such as confidential database query, where joint information (i.e. aggregate statistics) of the data may already be known. With this notion, we are also able to explore protocols (see Section IV) that tradeoff privacy in order to achieve higher rates than the sample-wise O'T protocol of Section III-A. When dealing with the above scenario with the disjoint privacy condition (3) replacing Alice's standard privacy condition (1), e speak of achievable string O'T rate with disjoint privacy ROT,m, and string O'T capacity with disjoint privacy COT,m.
A protocol is said to be perfectly private if the privacy constraints of (1) and (2) are exactly zero. The SFC capacity C for the particular sources, functions, and correlated randomness is defined as the largest achievable function computation rate, and°if no rate R > 0 is achievable.
iid • Source-model: For i == 1, ... , ti, (Xi, Yi) rv PX,Y. X"~(Xl, ... , X n ) is available to Alice and yn( YI,... , Yn) to Bob. • Channel-model: X" and yn are respectively the sequence of inputs and outputs of a discrete memory less channel (DMC) with conditional distribution P y IX , with X" selected by Alice and yn received by Bob. An acceptable (n, k )-protocol for source-model correlated randomness is defined as follows. First, Alice and Bob receive (A k , xn) and (B k , Y"), and generate local random variables ZA and ZB respectively, where ZA, ZB, (Ak, B k), and (X", Y") are mutually independent. Then, over r stages, Alice and Bob exchange messages M I , ... , M T over the error-free discussion channel, where in an odd numbered stage i Alice produces message M, as a function of everything available to her, namely (Ak, X", ZA, Mi-l), and in an even numbered stage j Bob produces the messages M j as a function of everything available to him, namely tB"; Y", Z B, M il ). At the end of the protocol, Alice and Bob produce function estimates pk and C k as functions of (A k, X", ZA, M T) and
An acceptable (n, k )-protocol for channel-model correlated randomness is similar to the source-model protocol, but (X", yn) are not given at the beginning of the protocol. Instead, the samples X" are generated by Alice, transmitted into the DMC, and outputs yn are received by Bob. The DMC transmissions may be arbitrarily interspersed with discussion stages (including happening entirely before or after the discussion messages are exchanged). At each stage or transmission, the discussion message or channel input symbol is a function of everything available to the sending party. A source-model protocol can be realized as a special case of the channel-model if Alice randomizes the inputs, for i == 1, ... , n, Xi~P x , and transmits before any discussion messages are sent.
For both models, R > 0 is called an achievable SFC rate for the particular sources, functions, and correlated randomness if for every E > 0, and all sufficiently large n, there exists an acceptable (n, k)-protocol with (kin) > R -E satisfying the following In this section, we present the sample-wise oblivious transfer (SWOT) protocol. Later on, by leveraging the SWOT protocol, we construct protocols for string OT with disjoint privacy (see Section IV-A) and for SFC (see Section V-A). The SWOT protocol utilizes correlated randomness in form of the binary erasure channel (BEC) and the binary erasure source (BES). The BEC(p) has the input and output
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is the the probability of erasure. The BES (p) has the joint distribution PX,Y(x, y) == (1/2)P y 1x(ylx). The protocol will be described as a source-model protocol for the BES(p), which is easily adapted into a channel-model protocol for the BEC(p) by adding the initial step of Alice transmitting n iid Bernoulli-(1/2) bits into the BEC in order to simulate n samples of a BES. Because of the interchangeability of the BEC and BES, we will write BESIBEC(p) to denote that the correlated randomness is either the BEC(p) or BES(p).
A. Sample-wise Oblivious Transfer Protocol
This protocol is inspired by the protocols for the binary erasure channel given by [9] , [10] . The novel aspects of our protocol are the treatment of sample-wise as opposed to string oblivious transfer and an abort mechanism for when privacy cannot be provided. This yields a perfectly private protocol with roughly the same negligible probability of error, and also simplifies both privacy and error analysis. The perfect privacy of this protocol is important since it enables it to be leveraged in a secure black-box manner to construct other protocols without complicating the privacy analysis. The basic idea of this protocol is to use the erasures of the BESIBEC to conceal the k(m -1) bits at the locations in A that Bob must remain ignorant of, while using the non-erasures to reveal the k bits at the locations in A that Bob has selected. • Bob is able create his function estimate C k by reversing the XOR since Y U is equal to Xu at locations corresponding to the locations of A that he has selected.
B. Analysis and Achievable Rates
The SWOT protocol is perfectly private for Bob since any U is uniformly possible given any realization of Bob's samples B'' because erasures uniformly and independently occur in Y". The protocol is perfectly private for Alice since C is only sent to Bob if the protocol does not abort and there have been enough erased bits, acting as a Bernoulli-(1/2) one-time pad, to mask the k(m -1) bits that should be concealed. The protocol is correct if it does not abort, thus the probability of error is bounded by the probability of aborting, which becomes negligible for n sufficiently large if k < n(1 -p) == IEISI and k(m -1) < np == IEISel, by the law of large numbers. Thus, the rate ROT,m == min( (1-p), p/ (m -1)) is achievable by this protocol. This protocol is distribution-free, that is, it is applicable for any source distribution, since the above arguments hold for any realization of the sources (A k , B k ) .
These results are summarized in the following theorem. The SWOT protocol achieves capacity. Note that this capacity is maximized at C == (11m) for the erasure probability p* == (m -1) / m, where the ratio of erasures to non-erasures matches the ratio of bits concealed to bits revealed. The SWOT protocol achieves capacity since it efficiently utilizes the erasures and non-erasures in revealing and concealing the appropriate bits.
IV. STRING OT WITH DISJOINT PRIVACY
The bootstrap OT (BOOT) protocol addresses the problem of string OT with the disjoint privacy condition (3). The SWOT protocol could also be applied to this problem, yielding the achievable rate given in Theorem 3.1 with the stronger sense of joint privacy (1). However, the BOOT protocol achieves rates that are better by a factor up to (( m -1) / pog2 m l) (when the probability of erasure p ::; 1/2) since it provides only disjoint privacy.
A. Bootstrap String Oblivious Transfer Protocol
The BOOT protocol for l-out-of-m string OT is parameterized by a finite sequence of u integers, 81, ... The basic idea is to encode each one of Alice's strings with the XOR of a different combination of u of these masking strings, taking one from each set {Zi,j }j~l for i == 1, ... ,u.
Alice first sends these encodings, denoted by G\, ... .c.; to Bob over the discussion channel. Then, for Bob to decode a particular string of Alice's, Alice and Bob perform u oblivious transfers where in the i-th OT Bob chooses from {Zi,j}j~l the masking string that is part of the combination masking the string of Alice's that he wants. The method in which each string of Alice is assigned a unique combination of masking strings can be visualized by a tree structure.
The encoding tree structure for the example of 1-out-of-6
string OT via the BOOT protocol with parameters u == 2, 81 == 2 and 82 == 3 is illustrated in Figure 1 . In this example, if Bob wishes to obtain A 3 , he would select Z1 1 in first round , of OT and then select Z2,3 in second round of OT, allowing him to reconstruct A 3 via 0 3 EB Zl,l EB Z2,3.
B. Analysis and Achievable Rates
The perfect privacy of the SWOT protocol guarantees that Bob only learns the particular combination of masking strings Zi,j that he selected, however, by the structure of the encoding, ISIT 2009, Seoul, Korea, June 28 - July 3, 2009 its possible for Bob to learn some information about Alice's strings beyond just the knowledge of A B . However, Bob will not be able to determine the specific value of any particular string Ai for i i= B. Consider the example of 1-out-of-6 string OT illustrated in Figure 1 are sufficient, which will happen with high probability for n sufficiently large provided that k / n is slightly less than the achievable rate determined by the following rate analysis.
For each round i == 1, ... , u, the SWOT protocol for 1out-of-a, OT of k-bit strings requires asymptotically ri; == k / ROT,si samples of the BESIBEC. The total number of samples of BESIBEC needed is n == L~=l ri; == L~=l k/ROT,si· Thus, the asymptotic rate achieved by this protocol is given by the following theorem. Hence, the string OT capacity (with disjoint privacy) is bounded below by
where the maximization is taken over the set of finite sequences of integers 81, ... , 8 u E {2, ... , m} such that rate for p = (1/2), ROT,m = 1/(2(m -1)) reveals an improvement in rate by a factor of ((m -1)/ (Ilog2 m l )).
The BOOT protocol achieves higher rates since it effectively recycles the erasures to conceal more bits. Some information is leaked since the erasures are being recycled, however, only joint functions of the strings (specifically the exclusive-or of multiple strings) are revealed while maintaining the disjoint privacy. Note that for the parameters u = 1 and 81 = m, the BOOT protocol achieves the same rate as the SWOT protocol. Thus, the BOOT protocol can achieve any rate achieved by the SWOT protocol. Figure 2 illustrates the achievable rates of the BOOT protocol, with m = 10, as a function of erasure probability p of the BES/BEC(p) , for various sets of parameters. Note that in different ranges, different sets of parameters are best.
The BOOT protocol for parameters {81 = 10} (giving the performance of the SWOT protocol) is best only in the range of erasure probability close to p = (m -l)/m and above.
V. SECURE FUNCTION COMPUTATION
The general secure function computation (GSFC) protocol leverages the SWOT protocol. It uses two oblivious transfers, where the first is from Alice to Bob and the second is from Bob to Alice, reversing the roles . Since the SWOT protocol uses a BESIBEC in the direction of the transfer, the GSFC protocol uses a BESIBEC available in both directions. The rate is determined as the ratio of function samples k to the total number of BES/BEC samples used in both directions.
A. General SFC Protocol
This protocol is applicable to any general sources and functions. Without loss of generality, let the finite source alphabets be given by A = {1, .. . , mA} and 8 = {1, . .. , mB}, and the ranges of the functions f and 9 be R f = {O, 1rand R g = {O, 1}h n respectively.
We outline the GSFC protocol with the following steps. For Bob to compute c-, Alice generates tn e, khB-bit strings, for i = 1, oo . ,mB, A~= (g(A 1 ,i) , oo . ,g(A k ,i)) . Bob expands his k source samples Bk to a vector of length kh B , where each clement of B k is repeated h B times to produce the samples ev». Alice and Bob then use the SWOT protocol to perform Ivout-of-rnn OT for kh B-bit strings with {AaZ::f as Alice 's strings, and Bob's selections vector as ev». The result of this OT gives Bob (g(A 1 , B 1 ) , . 0 0 , g (A k , B k ) ) . Similarly, for Alice to compute pk, Alice and Bob reverse roles and perform Ivout-of-rn a OT for khs-bit strings from Bob to Alice.
B. Analysis and Achievable Rates
The perfect privacy, negligible probability of error, and distribution-free properties of SWOT protocol imply the same properties in this secure function computation protocol. The l-out-of-mB OT for kh B-bit strings via the SWOT protocol asymptotically requires n1 = kh B / ROT ,m n samples of a BESIBEC from Alice to Bob, and likewise the other OT requires n2 = khA / ROT,mA samples of a BESIBEC from Bob to Alice, yielding the following theorem. The GSFC protocol is general, but not optimal since it does not exploit any source correlation or functional structure. Note that only one usage of the SWOT is necessary if one of the functions f, 9 is a function of (or the same as) the other. 
